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Three studies tested the effects of essentialist beliefs regarding the national ingroup in situations where a perpetrator
group has inflicted harm on a victim group. For members of the perpetrator group, it was hypothesised that ‘essentialism’
has a direct positive association with ‘collective guilt’ felt as a result of misdeeds conducted by other ingroup members in
the past. Simultaneously, it was hypothesised to have an indirect negative association with collective guilt, mediated by
perceived threat to the ingroup. Considering these indirect and direct effects jointly, it was hypothesised that the negative
indirect effect suppresses the direct positive effect, and that the latter would only emerge if perceived ‘ingroup threat’ was
controlled for. This was tested in a survey conducted in Latvia among Russians (N¼ 70) and their feelings toward how
Russians had treated ethnic Latvians during the Soviet occupation; and in a survey in Germany among Germans (N¼ 84),
focussing on their feelings toward the Holocaust. For members of the victim group, it was hypothesised that essentialism
would be associated with more anger and reluctance to forgive past events inflicted on other ingroup members. It was
proposed that this effect would be mediated by feeling connected to the ingroup victims. This was tested in a survey
conducted among Hong Kong Chinese and their feelings toward the Japanese and the Nanjing massacre (N¼ 56). Results
from all three studies supported the hypotheses. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Group-based atrocities are all too common: the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Sudan’s region of
Darfur, to name but a few. After such events, the descendants of both perpetrators and victims face the task of coming to
terms with the past. They can respond to such events, in which they are only implicated because of their group membership
and in which they were not personally involved, in a number of ways. The present research highlights the importance of
essentialist beliefs about the ingroup in determining what shape their responses take.
The perpetrators’ children and grandchildren might feel vicarious guilt and accept some kind of ‘inherited’
responsibility, or they might instead decide that they have nothing to do with events in which they were not directly
involved. Descendants of the perpetrator group can differ with regards to just how guilty they feel. Whether or not feelings
of guilt will be present can have important implications, because feelings of guilt (or the lack thereof) have been linked to
attitudes towards members of the victim group (Zimmermann, Abrams, & Eller, 2005), to the propensity to make an
apology (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004) and to attitudes towards affirmative action and other types of reparations to make
good past wrongdoings (Barkan, 2000; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Lickel,lloway, University of London, Egham, TW20 0EX, UK. E-mail: Hanna.Zagefka@rhul.ac.uk
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Essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities 719Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999; but see Harvey & Oswald, 2000). Because of this, studying
predictors of collective guilt is not only of theoretical but also of applied importance.
The victims’ children and grandchildren might still feel very angry about past events, or their anger might have
dissipated. Theymight have forgiven the perpetrator group, or might still be very reluctant to forgive thewrongdoings. The
levels of anger and forgiveness have, of course, important consequences for the quality of intergroup relations (Noor,
Brown, & Prentice, 2008), and studying their predictors is therefore also of both academic and practical importance. We
suggest that the emotional responses of members of both the perpetrator and victim groups will be shaped by the extent to
which they see the ingroup as defined in essentialist terms.ESSENTIALIST BELIEFS‘Once a bitch always a bitch’; this is what William Faulkner’s (1929) character of Jason says about Caddy, not because she
engages in sexually deviant behaviour (not yet anyway, although she arguably does so later as a result of a self-fulfilling
prophecy), but because her mother was purported to have done so. This illustrates nicely some important aspects of
essentialism, namely a belief that certain characteristics are inherited and therefore must have a natural (genetic or other
biological) basis, are unchangeable and stable and are informative, because one only needs to know about the character of
one category member to be able to make meaningful inferences about the character of other category members. We would
argue, as others have, that social research should avoid advancing primordial accounts of ethnic or national categories
(Suny, 2001; Verkuyten, 2004). Nonetheless, we do see essentialist beliefs about group memberships to be an important
object of study. Specifically, in this paper, we suggest that such beliefs are implicated in the way people relate to and feel
about historic intergroup atrocities.
In the psychological literature, essentialism has been conceptualised in various ways. Yzerbyt, Rocher, and
Schadron (1997) define it as a belief that all members of a social category have an essential feature in common, that
category memberships are immutable, that inferences about members of the category can be easily made, that
features of category members can be interpreted in light of a unifying theme and that category membership is
exclusive. For Medin (1989, see also Medin & Ortony, 1989), psychological essentialism is a belief that things have
essences or underlying natures that make them what they are. Similarly, Rothbart and Taylor (1992) and Hirschfeld
(1996) argue that social categories are often treated as if they were natural kinds. They are assumed to be discrete,
homogeneous with deep inherent intra-category similarities, mutually exclusive, unalterable and to have and rich
inductive potential.
A major area of discussion in the literature has concerned the relationship between essentialism and entitativity.
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000, 2002) see entitativity as one dimension of essentialism, with natural kinds as
another. For Kashima and colleagues (2005), essentialism is a component of entitativity. Others propose that essentialist
beliefs are distinct from (Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001; Yzerbyt, Estrada, Corneille, Seron, & Demoulin, 2004;
Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2001) and predicted by (Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006) the natural kinds and entitativity
dimensions. Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, and Ames (2006), meanwhile, use the term ‘essentialism’ to refer only to
beliefs about natural kinds with strong biological connotations and not to beliefs about entitativity.
Like Denson et al. (2006), we employ the term ‘essentialism’ to refer to beliefs about natural kinds. We are
interested in the biological component of psychological essentialism, as expressed in lay theories of genetic
determinism (for a similar focus, see Keller, 2005). Further, we are interested in such beliefs applied to nationality.
Ethnic representations of nationality, whereby national groups are defined in terms of a supposed shared ancestral
origin, are a particular case of essentialism (Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Ethnic nationalism presents national
group membership as something immutable, given by nature, and based on quasi-biological connections between
members of the national group (Connor, 1994; Smith, 2001). Membership of ethnically defined national categories can
be obtained only by birth, and the symbolism of shared ‘blood’ is often important (Ignatieff, 1993). In other words, by
‘essentialism’ we mean a belief that membership of a national category as well as the nature and character of this
category are determined by biological, genetic and hereditary factors. Substantially, it is a belief in the triumph of
nature over nurture; it is the belief that group membership is ‘written in the blood’, and that the ingroup’s ‘essence’
which defines its character is passed on through some unspecified biological or genetic process. It is this particular caseCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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essentialist, and might also be of interest in other contexts.
Representing social category membership in terms of ancestry has a particular relevance to the current studies for two
main reasons. Firstly, because we were interested in feelings about intergroup atrocities committed and suffered by
previous generations, group memberships that are seen as inherited and linked to blood become especially interesting.
Secondly, while non-biological forms of essentialism also exist, biological forms seem to be particularly important in
shaping motivated intergroup cognitions (Keller, 2005; see also Morton & Postmes, in press), and it is hence reasonable to
assume that they might also have powerful effects on group-based emotions. For these reasons, we operationalise
essentialism in a specifically biological way in the present context.INTERGROUP EMOTIONSAlthough the concept essentialism has been explored in studies of prejudice and intergroup relations, its impact on
collective emotions has not been studied, and this is a novel aspect of the present research. We are interested in collective
rather than personal emotions in the sense that they are experienced because of someone’s shared group membership with
a perpetrator/victim, without having personally participated in or suffered from the violence (Branscombe & Doosje,
2004; Smith, 1993). As such, the focus is on vicarious emotions (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). One can distinguish between
emotions felt by an individual because of actions by the ingroup (‘I feel guilty because of what we have done’; e.g. Brown,
Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008) and emotions ascribed to the ingroup because of ingroup actions (‘We should
feel guilty because of what we have done’; e.g. Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Both these emotions are commonly called
‘collective guilt’, and it is the former type that was assessed here. In parallel, for the victims we assessed their feelings of
anger because of what happened to other ingroup members, and their reluctance to forgive the perpetrators.
What, then, is the relationship between essentialism and guilt for the descendants of the perpetrators? On the basis of
existing literature, it is possible to make two contradictory predictions: There is reason to expect a negative association,
and at the same time there is also reason to expect a positive association. One aim of this paper was to resolve this apparent
contradiction.ESSENTIALISM DECREASING GUILTEssentialism has been linked to several beliefs which tend to vary systematically among the conservative-liberal or
rightwing–leftwing political spectrum. It is linked positively to a rejection of multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004;
see also No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood, & Chao, 2008), stereotyping (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Levy, Stoessner, & Dweck,
1998; Martin & Parker, 1995), prejudice against ethnic outgroup members (Allport, 1954; Epstein Jayaratne et al., 2006;
Keller, 2005, but see Haslam et al., 2002; Verkuyten, 2003), accentuation of differences between social groups (Yzerbyt
et al., 2001), social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &Malle, 1994; Keller, 2005) and rightwing
authoritarianism (Haslam & Levy, 2006). Essentialist arguments can be and often are used to justify and preserve existing
and promote desired social inequalities, by presenting them as natural and inevitable (Epstein Jayaratne et al., 2006;
Haslam et al., 2002; Keller, 2005; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). An example would be the use of
essentialist theories by Hitler to promote the ill treatment of Jews who were presented as ‘naturally inferior’ (Lerner,
1992).
Essentialism has also been linked directly to conservatism (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Keller, 2005; Lewontin, Rose, &
Kamin, 1984). This is to be expected, given that political conservatism and essentialism are arguably motivated by similar
psychological needs (Keller, 2005). Both conservatism (Duckitt, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &Sulloway, 2003) and
essentialism (Keller, 2005) can be thought of as motivated by trying to manage perceived threats to one’s existence or
privilege.
The link between essentialism and threat discussed by Keller (2005) is likely to be bidirectional. On the one hand,
those who feel threatened might start endorsing essentialist beliefs to psychologically manage this perceived threat. OnCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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rigid and less permeable, and they will also defend the idea that group boundaries should be so. In other words, ethnic
nationalist beliefs are both descriptive and normative. Therefore, essentialists should be more concerned with
trespassing and contamination of the ingroups’ essence by outsiders. They should also be more concerned with
protecting the ingroup from outside threats and threatened changes to the ingroup due to alien influences. They should
be more sensitive to perceived symbolic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) to the ingroup’s values, beliefs and
traditions.
Further, those who are preoccupied with perceived threats to the ingroup and ingroup protection should be more
inclined to justify the ingroup’s behaviour and to interpret it as defensible even if this behaviour harms a relevant
outgroup. A focus on protecting the ingroup against potential threats should reduce concerns for the well being of other
groups. People who feel threatened should be motivationally less inclined to attend to injustices inflicted on groups
other than their own, and they should also have fewer emotional resources to consider outgroup needs due to their
preoccupation with their own needs. More straightforward even, those who feel threatened should be less likely to admit
and report feelings of guilt, both privately and in front of others, because admitting ingroup culpability would directly
defeat the object of protecting the ingroup’s image and potentially also the ingroup’s resources (because admitting
culpability might lead to demands for compensation). In line with this reasoning, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) recently
demonstrated that salience of threats to the ingroup decreases collective guilt experienced because of atrocities
committed by the ingroup.
In sum, one might expect essentialism to be linked negatively and indirectly to feelings of guilt about the ingroup’s
behaviour, because essentialism is likely to be bound up with a tendency to see the ingroup as threatened. This perceived
threat, in turn, is likely to be negatively associated with feelings of guilt about past wrongdoings.ESSENTIALISM INCREASING GUILTNonewithstanding, one might just as well derive exactly the opposite prediction, and expect a positive effect of
essentialism on feelings of guilt. At the very core of the notion of essentialism is the proposition that all members of an
essential social category share certain traits. These traits might be related to appearance (e.g. blue eyes) or to character
(e.g. being impulsive). Most crucially, these traits are seen to have deep and unobservable foundations, which lend them
their immutable, stable ‘essence’. This essence is perceived to be too elementary, too fundamental to ever be exterminated.
High essentialists believe that an essence might be masked, but that it cannot be eradicated. They would argue that a person
born to German parents is German even if this person was adopted and moved to the UKwhen only 1 week old, even if this
person has never been to Germany, even if this person does not speak German and even if this person is not even aware of
their German origin.
Because of this, one might expect that high essentialists feel a more immutable, stable connection to other ingroup
members, be they past, present or future. After all, they perceive all group members to be linked to each other by a shared
‘essence’ which exists on the deepest, most fundamental level possible. In this sense, high essentialists should feel that
they are more implicated in the behaviour of fellow ingroup members than low essentialists. Hence, if ingroup members
commit a deed which is wrong and which therefore should trigger feelings of guilt, high essentialists should actually feel
more guilty than low essentialists, because they perceive themselves to be more fundamentally connected to the
perpetrators, and therefore more strongly implicated in their actions (for a similar argument, see Johns, Schmader, &
Lickel, 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006).
High essentialists are also likely to feel more interchangeable with other group members due to the perceived
commonalities on the most fundamental level. They might also assume that the negative behaviour was driven, at least
partially, by the shared ‘essence’ which informs all group members’ characters. This might lead to a feeling that they
could have displayed the negative behaviour themselves, which is another reason why high essentialists might feel more
guilty. In contrast, low essentialists might not feel interchangeable with the perpetrators, and they might be more
inclined to explain past misdeeds by historic and cultural circumstances (which are seen to be more prone to change and
which the contemporary person need not necessarily share with the perpetrators). Low essentialists will therefore feel
less guilty. Hence, although we do not propose that essentialism is the only variable affecting levels of guilt (see e.g.
Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006), we propose that it is an important factor.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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will be positively related to perceived ingroup threats and concerns for ingroup protection. This, in turn, it will be linked
negatively to feelings of guilt about the ingroup’s behaviour. However, due to the nature of the belief, high essentialists are
also likely to feel more linked to other ingroup members, and more implicated in their behaviour. Hence, essentialism
should be linked positively to feelings of guilt.
This positive link, however, will only emerge if one controls for perceived threats with which essentialism is usually
part and parcel. If one statistically controls for and partials out this threat component, what otherwise would look like a
zero effect of essentialism on guilt should turn into a positive effect. In statistical terms, we would expect a direct positive
effect of essentialism on guilt, and an indirect negative effect, mediated by ingroup threat. Since we hypothesise that the
indirect negative effect is so strong that it will wipe out the direct positive effect unless it is controlled for, statistically
speaking this is a hypothesised suppression effect. The proposed mechanisms are summarised in Figure 1.ESSENTIALISM AFFECTING ANGER AND FORGIVENESSAs outlined above, another aim of this research was to explore the effect of essentialist beliefs on how the descendants of
the victims, not only the perpetrators, respond to past atrocities. Essentialist beliefs can be assumed to have important
consequences for the way the descendants of the victim group make sense of the past. Just as high essentialists in the
perpetrator group might feel more connected to those ingroup members who committed the negative acts, high
essentialists in the victim group might feel more connected to the ingroup victims. They will perceive themselves to be
linked to the victims on a deep, very fundamental level. Hence, high essentialists will feel that the experiences of other
ingroup members concern them more personally than low essentialists. Because high essentialists will feel more
implicated in the experiences of other ingroup members, they are more likely to feel angry and unwilling to forgive bad
events that happened in the past. This, then, constitutes a mediation hypothesis: Essentialism among members of the
victim group will lead to more anger and greater reluctance to forgive past events, because essentialism leads to more
feelings of connectedness with the ingroup victims.
Three studies were conducted to test these hypotheses. The effects of essentialism on guilt among members of a
perpetrator group were tested with Russians in Latvia and their feelings about how Russians had treated ethnic Latvians
during the Soviet occupation. A study conducted in Germany among Germans and their feelings toward the Holocaust also
tested the effects of essentialism among members of a perpetrator group. The effects of essentialism on anger and
forgiveness among members of a victim group were tested in a study conducted among Hong Kong Chinese and their
feelings toward the Nanjing massacre.LATVIAN STUDYThe effect of essentialism on guilt was first tested in Latvia. Latvia is located between the Baltic Sea and Russia. It was
invaded by Soviet troops during WWII and absorbed into the Soviet Union, where it remained (with a brief interlude inFigure 1. Hypothesised effects of essentialism and ingroup threat on guilt
Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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in the expulsion, deportation and murder of national elites, the confiscation of private property and the banning of religious
worship and cultural manifestations of Latvian nationalism. Soviet nationality policy led to the deportation of tens of
thousands of ethnic Latvians, collectivisation, purges, Russification, political violence, economic stagnation and
environmental pollution (Smith, Aasland, & Mole, 1994). Latvia finally regained independence in 1991. Due to the
encouragement of Soviet migration to Latvia during the occupation, today over one-third of the Latvian population is
Russian-speaking. For most Latvians, this sizable minority is associated with the former occupying power, and is held
responsible for events that occurred during the occupation. At the same time, many Russian speakers in Latvia today feel
themselves unjustly oppressed (for instance, the use of the Russian language has been restricted since 2004). The present
study focussed on Russian speakers in Latvia, and their feelings about the way Latvians were treated during the
occupation.Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 70 Russian speakers participated in the study. Their age varied between 12 and 75, with a mean
age of 30 years. There were 46 females and 22 males (two participants did not indicate their gender).
Procedure and Measures
Participants filled out a questionnaire which contained the measures in Russian. They had been carefully translated and
back-translated from English. Drawing on existing measures of essentialism (e.g. Demoulin et al., 2006; Haslam et al.,
2000, 2002; Pehrson et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004) and related constructs such as genetic lay theories (Epstein
Jayaratne et al., 2006) and ‘belief in genetic determinism’ (Keller, 2005), we generated a 7-item scale of essentialism
(1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). The items were ‘It is our Russian blood that basically makes us who we are
throughout our lives’; ‘It is largely our Russian biological heritage which determines who and how we are’; ‘The Russian
character is largely determined by genetic factors’; ‘Something in the blood has defined the Russian character throughout
history’; ‘Russians prefer to stick together because of their shared blood’; ‘What makes a Russian a Russian isn’t in the
blood’ (reversed); ‘If someone has Russian parents then this person is automatically Russian too, even if he/she has never
been to Russia and if he/she doesn’t speak any Russian’; a¼ .71.
To measure perceived ingroup threat, a 4-item measure was devised (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). Items
express a conviction that the ingroup is threatened in important ways and that it needs to be defended against this threat.
Items were ‘I am concerned that we Russians are losing our identity’; ‘We should make sure the Russian way of life is
preserved’; ‘We should defend our distinctiveness’ and ‘It would be unfortunate if the Russian culture changed too much
due to influences from outside’; a¼ .81.
Guiltwas measured with a 4-item scale modelled on Brown et al. (2008, 1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). Items
were: ‘I feel guilty for the way that Russians treated the Latvians under Stalin’; ‘Even though I was not personally
involved, I feel guilty when I think about the treatment that Latvians received from us Russians under Stalin’; ‘When I
think about how we Russians suppressed the Latvian language and culture during the Soviet era, I feel guilty’ and
‘Although I was not involved personally, I feel guilty as a Russian when I think about how Latvians were deported to
Siberia during the Soviet period’; a¼ .84.
The questionnaire also contained some additional items, such as a 1-item measure of dispositional guilt (‘In general, I
don’t often feel guilty because of the things I’ve done’ (reversed)) inspired by Doosje et al. (1998), and a 2-itemmeasure of
perceived complicity of the civil population inspired by Rozin (2003, example item ‘What happened to the Latvians under
Stalin was mainly the responsibility of the Russian politicians, and not of the Russian people’ (reversed), r¼ .87). Such
items can be usefully employed as control variables (Doosje et al., 1998). The questionnaire ended with some
demographic questions. Upon completion of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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Preliminary Analyses
First, a factor analysis with Varimax rotation was performed with all essentialism and threat items to confirm that these two
constructs were indeed empirically as well as conceptually distinct. As expected, all essentialism items loaded on one
factor and all threat items loaded on a second factor (loading for essentialism items ranging from .48 to .77 on the first
factor and .05 to .41 on the second factor; loadings for threat items ranging from .60 to .85 on the second factor and .09 to
.27 on the first factor).
The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) on the measures were 3.97 (1.03) for essentialism; 1.93 (1.22) for
guilt and 5.26 (1.94) for threat. To test for mean differences between the younger and the older participants on key
variables, the sample was median split (median¼ 25 years). There were no significant differences on any of the variables,
and age and other demographic variables did not moderate any of the effects reported below.
Does Ingroup Threat Mediate the Relationship Between Essentialism and Guilt?
According to the hypothesis, we expected a direct positive effect of essentialism on guilt, and an indirect negative effect,
mediated by ingroup threat. Moreover, the direct positive effect was predicted only to emerge if ingroup threat was
controlled for. The bi-variate correlations between the three constructs are displayed in Figure 2 (correlation coefficients
not in parentheses). As hypothesised, the direct effect of essentialism on guilt was not significant.
To testwhether a positive effect of essentialismonguiltwouldemerge if ingroup threat is controlled for, guiltwas regressed
simultaneously from essentialism and ingroup threat.Dispositional guilt and complicity of the civilian population were also
entered in the regression as additional control variables (b¼ .22, ns for guilt; b¼.03, ns for complicity). The model
explained12%of thevariance inguilt,F (4, 65)¼ 2.26,p< .07.Thebvalues are displayed inFigure 2 (values in parentheses).
In linewith the hypothesis, therewas an indirect negative path fromessentialism toguilt via ingroup threat, and controlling for
ingroup threat made it possible for the direct positive effect of essentialism on guilt to emerge.
Alternative Models
In spite of the fact that no a priori hypotheses were held about opposite causal directions, alternative models were tested to
find somewhat stronger support for the proposed causal direction of effects, given the correlational nature of the data.
Specifically, two alternative mediation models were tested. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), three conditions
need to be fulfilled for mediation to be present: (1) The independent variable has to significantly predict the mediator; (2)
the independent variable has to significantly predict the dependent variable and (3) when independent variable and
mediator predict the dependent variable simultaneously, the effect of the independent variable must be significantly
reduced and the mediator must still exert a significant effect.
It was first tested whether the effect of guilt on essentialismmight be mediated by threat. As indicated above, no a priori
hypothesis was held about this, but it is nonetheless conceivable that guilt would reduce threat because those who feel
guilty see the ingroup as less worth defending, and they might therefore be less acutely aware of and bothered by potential
threats. Threat, in turn, might be expected to be associated with more essentialism, because—as outlined earlier—
essentialist beliefs might precisely arise as a psychological response to cope with perceived threat. However, mediation
was clearly not present, because—as evinced by the correlation coefficients in Figure 2—the data did not match BaronFigure 2. The effect of essentialism and ingroup threat on guilt in study 1 (Latvia) (bi-variate correlations outside parentheses,
standardised b values inside parentheses)
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p< .001.
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mediator) or second condition (there was no significant correlation between the independent variable and dependent
variable).
Second, although it is hard to conceive of a hypothesis why the effect of guilt on threat might be mediated by
essentialism, this was also examined and rejected on the grounds that Baron and Kenny’s first and second conditions were
violated (see correlation coefficients in Figure 2). Hence, it was concluded that, as hypothesised, the suppression model
was the one to best account for the data.Discussion
Some clear evidence was found for the hypotheses. There was an indirect negative path from essentialism to guilt via
ingroup threat. Further, a direct positive path from essentialism to guilt emerged only when controlling for the negative
indirect effect. Alternative mediation models were ruled out. Hence, as expected, ingroup threat clearly acted as a
suppressor of the effect of essentialism on guilt. In spite of these encouraging findings, it should be noted that the joint
effects of essentialism and ingroup threat on guilt were not overly strong, with the R2 being only marginally significant.
Hence, in a next step we endeavoured to test the hypothesis in a different national context, to test for the replicability and
generalisability of the effects.GERMAN STUDYThe Nazi regime in Germany, which was in power from 1933 to 1945, killed millions of people whom it saw as belonging
to an inferior form of life. Among them were Roma and disabled people, but the biggest victim group were 6 million Jews.
This atrocity is what the current study focussed on by asking contemporary German participants about their feelings about
these events (for more information on collective guilt in Germany, see Buruma, 1994; Kempe, 1999; Rensmann, 2004).Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 84 people participated in the study. Their age varied between 13 and 78, with a mean age of 35
years. Seven participants had been excluded from the analyses, because according to self-reports they were not white
German nationals. There were 55 females and 29 males.
Procedure and Measures
Participants filled out a questionnaire in German which contained the measures as translated below. Questionnaires had
been translated and back-translated from/to English. Essentialism was measured with a 6-item scale (1¼ totally disagree
to 7¼ totally agree). The items were very similar to the ones used in the Latvian study. However, some items were toned
down or reversed, because they otherwise would have sounded too much like Nazi propaganda, and we feared reactance
effects. In particular, we avoid the word ‘blood’ as much as possible. The items were ‘It is largely our German biological
heritagewhich determines who and howwe are’; ‘Something in our heritage influences the German character, and this will
always be that way’; ‘The German character is largely determined by genetic factors’; ‘If someone has German parents
then this person is automatically German too, even if he/she has never been to Germany and if he/she doesn’t speak any
German’; ‘Our German heritage means that all Germans somehow belong to each other’ and ‘Someone can be German
even if his/her parents come from another country and are not German (reverse coded)’; a¼ .72.
However, even with this adjusted version of the essentialism scale, we were not sure whether the scale would yield
meaningful results. We feared that its content might be too sensitive and cause reaction effects in Germany due to genetic
ideas having been such a prominent component of the Nazi rhetoric. Indeed, there was anecdotal evidence, supported byCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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want to answer the questions. Anticipating this, we included another general essentialism scale, which seemed somewhat
less controversial. This alternative scale was adapted from Rozin (2003, see also Rozin et al., 2008). It consisted of six
items (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree), all following the same format: ‘Someone who was born as an X will
necessarily always be an X throughout his/her life’. The target categories were Bavarian, Woman, German, Jew, Muslim
and Turk. The items correlated well with each other; a¼ .89. They also correlated well with the original essentialism scale,
r¼ .49, p< .001, confirming their relatedness.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence in the form of oral and written comments suggested that the German participants took great
offence to the original essentialism scale. As expected, they seemed to feel considerably less reluctant to fill out the general
scale. Hence, it was decided that the general essentialism scale might be a more useful measurement tool than then
original essentialism scale in the German context.
Ingroup threat was measured with the same four items as in the Latvian study, plus an additional two items (1¼ totally
disagree to 7¼ totally agree). These were ‘It is natural for the country’s character to change’ (reversed); and ‘It is good if
our national character changes over time’ (reversed); a¼ .88.
Guiltwas measured with a 4-item scale (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). The gist of the items was very similar
to the items in the Latvian study, although of course items were adapted to fit the German setting. The items were ‘I feel
guilty when I think about what we Germans did to the Jews during the Nazi era’; ‘When I think about what we did to the
Jews during the Nazi era I feel really bad’; ‘Even though I did not personally do anything bad to the Jews, I feel guilty for
what other Germans have done’ and ‘Although I personally have done no harm to the Jews, I feel guilty because I am
German’; a¼ .94. Note that many of the items are somewhat ‘evasive’ in their wording, i.e. they talk about ‘what we did to
the Jews’ rather than ‘how we murdered the Jews’. This was done deliberately to avoid possible reactance effects.
The questionnaire also contained some additional items, such as a 2-item scale of dispositional guilt (example item ‘In
general, I don’t often feel guilty because of the things I’ve done’, r¼ .35) inspired by Doosje et al. (1998), and a 2-item
scale of perceived complicity of the civil population in the Holocaust inspired by Rozin (2003, example item ‘What
happened to the Jews in the Nazi era was mainly the responsibility of the leading Nazis and not of the civil population’
(reversed), r¼ .35). Again, following the logic of Doosje and colleagues (1998), these items were included for use as
additional control variables. The questionnaire ended with some demographic items. Upon completion of the study,
participants were thanked and debriefed.Results
Preliminary Analyses
Again, a factor analysis with Varimax rotation was performed with all essentialism and threat items to confirm that these
two constructs were empirically distinct. As expected, all essentialism items loaded on one factor and all threat items
loaded on a second factor (loading for essentialism items ranging from .58 to .91 on the first factor and .05 to .37 on the
second factor; loadings for threat items ranging from .71 to .85 on the second factor and .11 to .31 on the first factor).
The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the main constructs were 2.86 (1.45) for the general
essentialism, 3.54 (1.97) for guilt and 3.14 (1.20) for threat. The sample was median split (median¼ 31 years) to test for
mean differences between the younger and the older participants on key variables. The only significant difference emerged
for ‘guilt’. Curiously, young people felt more guilty than older people, t (73)¼ 2.05; p< .05; Ms¼ 4.00, 3.08. However,
age or other demographic variables did not moderate any of the effects reported below.
Does Ingroup Threat Mediate the Relationship Between Essentialism and Guilt?
According to the hypotheses, we expected an indirect negative effect of essentialism on guilt, mediated by ingroup threat.
We also expected a direct positive effect, which was hypothesised to emerge only after the indirect negative effect was
controlled for. Given the reactance caused by the original essentialism scale, the essentialism measure used in the analyses
is the general essentialism scale adopted from Rozin. The bi-variate correlations between the three constructs are
displayed in Figure 3 (correlations coefficients not in parentheses).Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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Figure 3. The effect of essentialism and ingroup threat on guilt in study 2 (Germany) (bi-variate correlations outside parentheses,
standardised b values inside parentheses)
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p< .001
Essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities 727As hypothesised, the overall effect of essentialism on guilt was not significant. To test whether a positive effect of
essentialism on guilt would emerge if ingroup threat is controlled for, guilt was regressed simultaneously from
essentialism and ingroup threat. Dispositional guilt and complicity in the Holocaust were also entered in the regression as
additional control variables (b¼.11, ns for guilt; b¼ .26, p< .05 for complicity). The model explained 20% of the
variance in guilt, F (4, 70)¼ 4.49, p< .003. The b values are displayed in Figure 3 (values in parentheses). In line with the
hypotheses, controlling for ingroup threat made it possible for the direct positive effect of essentialism on guilt to emerge.
Alternative Models
As in the previous study, it was first tested whether the effect of guilt on essentialism might be mediated by threat.
Mediation was clearly not present, because Baron and Kenny’s second condition was not met (see correlation coefficients
in Figure 3).
Second, it was examined whether the effect of guilt on threat might be mediated by essentialism. This was rejected
because Baron and Kenny’s first condition was violated (see correlation coefficients in Figure 3). Hence, again alternative
models could be ruled out, providing further corroborating evidence for the hypothesised effects.Discussion
As in study 1, clear evidence was found in support of the hypotheses. Essentialism clearly had the predicted indirect
negative effect on guilt. What is more, when controlling for this indirect effect, the hypothesised direct positive effect of
essentialism on guilt emerged. Of course, studying the effects of essentialism in Germany was encumbered by the fact that
essentialist ideas were drawn on heavily by Nazi propaganda, and that German participants were very reluctant to answer
our items, leading to reactance effects of our essentialism scale. However, to our mind this actually led to a significant
advantage, because anticipating this meant that we included and could demonstrate the effects of a more generalised
essentialism belief scale. Rozin’s (2003) scale is more generalised in the sense that it assesses inalterability with regards to
a number of different groups, and it is noteworthy that this more generalised essentialism measure still exerted the same
effects on guilt as the more specific measure of study 1. With Rozin’s measure, the effects of an essentialist mindset were
even stronger than that found in the Latvian context, and undeniably in the hypothesised direction. Having obtained this
corroborating evidence, in a next step we turned to the victim group, to explore the effects of essentialism on the other side
of the divide.HONG KONG STUDYThe massacre of Nanjing refers to the events that took place after this Chinese town fell into the hands of the Japanese in
1937. Japanese soldiers behaved very brutally towards the Chinese population during acts of looting, arson and the
execution of prisoners of war and civilians. It is estimated that around 300 000 Chinese were killed, and many more raped
or harmed otherwise. To date, differential preferences for portraying the events still cause tensions between China and
Japan, with many Chinese feeling that the Japanese do not properly acknowledge what happened. However, today many
individuals in each nation recognise the events as the horrific war crimes they were.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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victim group. Crucially, it was expected that essentialism would be positively associated with feelings of anger and a
reluctance to forgive past events, and that this effect would be mediated by feeling connected with the victims. Those who
are high in essentialism would feel that they share a deep, meaningful substance with ingroup victims, and would hence
feel more connected to them. Feeling connected to the victims would in turn exacerbate the emotional responses to their
suffering, and hence impact on anger and reluctance to forgive.Method
Participants
56 Hong Kong Chinese participated in the study (mean age 27.32; 24 males, 32 females).
Procedure and Measures
Participants filled out a questionnaire in Cantonese which contained the measures as translated below. Questionnaires had
been translated and back-translated from/to English by independent bilinguals.
Essentialism was measured with an abbreviated 4-item scale very similar to the one used in the Latvian study (1¼ low
essentialism to 7¼ high essentialism); a¼ .78.
Anger was measured with a 4-item scale (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). Items were ‘I feel angry for the way
that the Japanese treated the Chinese in the Nanjing Massacre’; ‘Even though I was not personally involved, I still feel
angry when I think about how the Japanese have treated the Chinese in the Nanjing Massacre’; ‘When I think about how
the Japanese have raped Nanjing during the war, I still feel angry’; ‘Although I was not involved personally, I still feel
angry as a Chinese when I think about how many Chinese were killed in the Nanjing Massacre’; a¼ .96.
Reluctance to forgivewas measured with a 7-item scale (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree). Items were ‘I feel it is
hard to forgive the Japanese for what they did to the Chinese during the Nanjing Massacre’; ‘I think the Japanese should
feel ashamed for what they did to the Chinese’; ‘I think the Chinese should ask for compensation from the Japanese for
what happened’; ‘I have difficulties in treating the Japanese equally to other people due to the previous offences carried out
by them’; ‘It is hard for Chinese people to have Japanese friends due to what the Japanese did to the Chinese’; ‘I believe
some apology from the Japanese should be made for their treatment of the Chinese in the past’; ‘I think the Japanese owe
something to the Chinese because of their behaviour in the past’; a¼ .86.
Feeling connected with the victims was measured with one item: ‘To what extent would you use the word ‘we’ to
describe your relations with the victims of Nanjing’? (1¼ not at all to 7¼ very much). The questionnaire also included
some items on demographics. Upon conclusion of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) on the variables were as follows: 4.17 (1.36) for essentialism, 3.98
(1.63) for connectedness with the victims, 5.72 (1.23) for anger and 4.57 (1.19) for reluctance to forgive. The sample was
median split (median¼ 22 years) to test for mean differences between the younger and the older participants on all
variables. Significant differences emerged for ‘connectedness with the victims’ (F (1, 51)¼ 4.78, p< .05), with older
participants feeling more connectedness with the victims (Ms¼ 4.42, 3.48). However, age or other demographic variables
did not moderate any of the effects reported below.
Is essentialism positively associated with more anger and greater reluctance to forgive, and is this effect mediated by
perceived connectedness with the victims?
To test whether the effect of essentialism on reluctance to forgive was mediated by connectedness with the victims,
again Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-step method was used.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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Figure 4. The effect of essentialism and anger and reluctance to forgive in study 3 (Hong Kong) (bi-variate correlations outside
parentheses, standardised b values inside parentheses)
Essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities 729Anger as DV As can be seen in the top half of Figure 4, essentialism significantly predicted connection to the victims
(correlation coefficient outside parentheses), fulfilling the first condition stipulated by Baron and Kenny (1986).
Essentialism also significantly predicted anger, fulfilling the second condition. Finally, when anger was regressed
simultaneously from essentialism and connectedness (see b values in parentheses), the b for connectedness was significant,
while the b for essentialism was not. The R2 for this model was .43, p< .001. Hence, the effect was indeed mediated.
Reluctance to Forgive as DV As can be seen in the lower half of Figure 4, essentialism significantly predicted
connectedness (correlationcoefficientoutsideparentheses), fulfilling thefirst condition.As indicatedabove, essentialismalso
significantly predicted reluctance to forgive, fulfilling the second condition. Finally, when reluctance to forgivewas regressed
simultaneously from essentialism and connectedness (see b values in parentheses), the b for connectedness was significant,
while the b for essentialism was not. The R2 square for this model was .37, p< .001. Hence, the effect was indeed mediated.
Alternative Models
Again, although no alternative hypotheses had been held a priori, a couple of other mediation models were tested to yield
corroborating evidence for the hypothesised effects. First, it was examined whether the effect of connectedness on anger
was mediated by essentialism. This was ruled out because Baron and Kenny’s third condition was violated: When
predicting anger simultaneously from connectedness and essentialism, the b for the proposed mediator was not significant,
b¼ .04, ns. Second, it was tested whether the effect of connectedness on reluctance to forgive is mediated by essentialism.
This was ruled out because again Baron and Kenny’s third condition was violated: When predicting reluctance
simultaneously from connectedness and essentialism, the b for the proposed mediator was not significant, b¼ .19, ns. In
short, the hypothesised mediation model was confirmed by the data while some unhypothesised alternative models were
not, yielding further evidence for the expected effects.
Discussion
Clear evidence was found in support of the hypotheses. Essentialism was positively associated with anger and reluctance
to forgive past events for members of the victim group, and these effects were mediated by feeling connected to the
victims. Having a single-item measure for connectedness was less than optimal, because it can be assumed to increase
random measurement errors. However, because random measurement errors effectively lead to more conservative testing
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), it should be noted that a more reliable (multi-item) measure would be likely to reveal an even
stronger mediated effect rather than a weaker one.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 718–732 (2010)
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supported the idea that essentialist beliefs are both positively and negatively linked to feelings of collective guilt among
members of the perpetrator group, and that the negative indirect effect suppresses the direct positive effect unless
controlled for. A further study, broadening the scope by focussing on yet another national setting, confirmed that
essentialist beliefs also inform responses to past atrocities by members of the victim group. Essentialism was positively
related to anger and a reluctance to forgive past actions, and these effects were mediated by feeling connected with the
victims.
Heretofore, the literatures on group characteristics like perceived essentialism on the one hand and intergroup emotions
like guilt on the other have been developing relatively separately (although, see Denson et al., 2006). This paper draws on
both, and in this hopefully demonstrates that considering both types of concepts can lead to research of both applied and
theoretical importance. It also underscores that although essentialism has been linked to negative intergroup outcomes, it
can also be associated with positive outcomes. This supports the position of others who have demonstrated that the effects
of essentialism depend on the situation, and cannot be assumed to be all bad or all good (Epstein Jayaratne et al., 2006;
Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Verkuyten, 2003).
What, then, are the strength and weaknesses of the present research? In terms of weaknesses, one obvious shortcoming
of the present work is that it is correlational by nature. Stronger evidence for the proposed causal direction of effects could,
of course, have been obtained using an experimental method. Although it is assumed that important concepts like
essentialist beliefs are not easily manipulated, and although there are considerable ethical complications in attempting to
manipulate them, achieving this might not be impossible and could usefully be attempted in the future. In terms of
strengths, we believe the current work benefits from investigating the effects of essentialism in three very different national
settings, and among members of both sides of the intergroup events. This makes it possible to draw more generalised
conclusions than if the focus had been on one setting, or one group, only.
There are a few issues worthy of future exploration. First of all, readers might recall that the hypothesis for a direct
positive effect of essentialism on guilt among members of the perpetrator group was based on the argument that
essentialism would increase feeling connected to the perpetrators, and feeling implicated in their behaviours. Although a
reasonable assumption, the present research did not measure these additional mediators, and future research could usefully
include such measures. Secondly, psychological research on intergroup emotions has often focussed jointly on two similar
but nonetheless qualitatively different emotions, namely shame and guilt (e.g. Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, &
Ames, 2005). The present research focussed on only one of these emotions, but future research could usefully extend this
contribution by including both. Last but not least, future work could study simultaneously the effects of shared essence
with victims and perpetrators. In many settings, people will be inclined to feel a certain connection to members of both
groups, and it would be very interesting to explore how these perceived associations come into play together to affect
responses to historic intergroup injustices.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe first author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict.
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